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Congressional Government Rebooted:
Randomized Committee Assignments and
Legislative Capacity
Brian D. Feinstein*
INTRODUCTION
The contemporary U.S. Congress suffers from three related pathologies:
a propensity to delegate broad policy-making functions to the executive
branch, an increasingly partisan atmosphere that impedes its ability to address the nation’s problems, and a lack of public confidence in the institution. These phenomena not only diminish the stature of Congress as a
formally co-equal branch of government, but also reduce the quality of government policy. Moreover, if these trends continue unabated, they may lead
to a potentially dangerous concentration of power in the hands of other political actors. To reverse this trajectory, this article presents a novel change to
Congress’s internal institutional design: replacing the current committee assignment system with one in which members are randomly assigned committee portfolios.
This article proceeds in six parts. Part I traces Congress’s long decline
in importance relative to the executive branch, along with an epiphenomenal
decline in public confidence; notes the dangers that these trends present if
left unchecked; and offers a reform to the committee assignment system as a
partial corrective. Part II presents the basic contours of the proposed reform.
Part III discusses the prospective effects of this proposal on Congress’s internal functioning, emphasizing the reform’s potential impact on party organizations, on committees as repositories of expertise and venues for
deliberation, and on the roles that interest groups and political minorities
play in the policy-making process. Next, Part IV examines the likely effects
of this reform on legislative-executive dynamics, paying particular attention
to committee oversight of the administrative state, and the continued, postChadha use of committee-based veto mechanisms. Part V turns to Congress-court interactions, arguing that the reform could encourage greater use
of legislative history in statutory interpretation and promote a more deferential posture in assessing the constitutionality of statutes. Finally, Part VI
addresses the feasibility of implementing this proposal.

* Law Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; J.D., Harvard Law School,
2012; Ph.D., Government, Harvard University, 2009. I thank Josh Chafetz, Charles Griffin,
Julia Cadaval Martins, Joshua Matz, Mitchell Reich, Tazneen Shahabuddin, Matthew Stephenson, and Laurence Tai for their thoughtful comments on an earlier draft.
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The persistent unpopularity of Congress, the supposed “popular
branch” of government, is one of the great paradoxes of American politics.1
Critiquing Congress is by no means a new phenomenon,2 but, with public
approval of Congress recently declining to approximately ten to thirteen percent, such critical voices appear to be building to a crescendo.3 Alongside
this long decline in public confidence in Congress, recent generations have
seen a similar secular decline in Congress’s policy-making powers.4 Over
120 years after the publication of Congressional Government, Woodrow
Wilson’s thesis has been turned on its head; no longer does Congress, with
its powerful committees as “little legislatures,” predominate over the other
branches of government.5
As a response to these twin declines in congressional capacity and in
public confidence in Congress, scholarly attention has turned to rethinking
the institutional design of the legislative branch. In recent years, think tanks
and law reviews have convened symposia to propose reforms for “the broken branch.”6 One prominent public intellectual has even called for a constitutional convention, in large part to address perceived congressional
pathologies.7
A. Lawmaking and Delegation
These concerns are justified. Congressional capacity—that is, the institution’s relative ability to influence the country’s legal landscape—has been

1
See Richard Fenno, If, as Ralph Nader Says, Congress is “The Broken Branch,” How
Come We Love Our Congressmen So Much?, in CONGRESS IN CHANGE: EVOLUTION AND REFORM 277, 277 (Norman J. Ornstein ed., 1975).
2
See, e.g., ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 200 (J.P. Mayer ed.,
George Lawrence trans., Doubleday 1969) (1835) (“When one enters the House of Representatives at Washington, one is struck by the vulgar demeanor of that great assembly.”).
3
See Congressional Job Approval, REAL CLEAR POL., http://www.realclearpolitics.com/
epolls/other/congressional_job_approval-903.html (last visited Dec. 24, 2012) (reporting the
results of public opinion surveys conducted during January and February 2012).
4
See SEAN GAILMARD & JOHN W. PATTY, LEARNING WHILE GOVERNING: INFORMATION,
ACCOUNTABILITY, AND EXECUTIVE BRANCH INSTITUTIONS 203 (2012) (noting that over the
course of American history, “the broad sweep of power relations between the legislative and
executive branches favors the latter to an increasing extent”).
5
Compare WOODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT: A STUDY IN AMERICAN
POLITICS 103, 113 (15th ed. 1901), with THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM: THE
SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1979).
6
Symposium, The Most Disparaged Branch: The Role of Congress in the Twenty-First
Century, 89 B.U. L. REV. 331 (2009); Symposium, Congressional Power, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y
REV. 3 (2007); Symposium, One Year Later: Is Congress Still the Broken Branch?, The
Brookings Institution (Jan. 22, 2008).
7
See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS—AND A PLAN TO STOP IT (2011).
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in a decades-long decline.8 Beginning to a large extent in the New Deal era,
Congress routinely enacts statutes delegating considerable policy-making
discretion to administrative agencies. Charges that Congress has ceded significant policy-making ground to the White House became amplified in recent years.9 Concerning a host of issues related to the War on Terror,
Congress either gave the President carte blanche or, when it legislated, arguably did so merely as a rubber stamp, providing statutory cover for actions
that the executive branch already had undertaken.10
In the face of this sustained transfer of policy-making authority from
Congress to the executive branch, the judiciary mostly has remained silent.
The deceptively titled nondelegation doctrine permits massive transfers of
authority to the executive, provided solely that such transfers are guided by a
bare-bones “intelligible principle.”11 Remarkably, the Supreme Court has
upheld every statutory delegation to the administrative state challenged on
nondelegation grounds that it has considered since 1935.12
Furthermore, some scholars charge that the legislative branch not only
has ceded much of its ex ante policy-making role to the executive branch but
also that it neglects its ex post responsibility to monitor executive policy
making.13 Thomas Mann and Norman Ornstein decry the “disappearance”
of congressional oversight;14 they consider the infrequency of oversight hearings to be a key factor in their diagnosis of Congress as “the broken
branch.”15 Although it is important to note that this “congressional abdication” perspective is contested in the academic literature,16 the very fact that
8
See generally Josh Chafetz, Congress’s Constitution, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 715, 717 n.2
(2012) (providing an overview of “commentators . . . decry[ing] the growth in presidential
power”).
9
See THOMAS MANN & NORMAN ORNSTEIN, THE BROKEN BRANCH: HOW CONGRESS IS
FAILING AMERICA AND HOW TO GET IT BACK ON TRACK 97 (2006).
10
See Patricia Wald & Neil Kinkopf, Putting Separation of Powers Into Practice: Reflections on Senator Schumer’s Essay, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 41, 68–69 (2007) (“Congress has
enacted sweeping legislation [regarding enemy-combatant detention policy] that largely authorizes the President to do what he has been doing.”).
11
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474 (2001).
12
See JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE 134 (1997) (“Since the
Schechter case, the Supreme Court has not invalidated a single statute on the basis of excessive
delegation.”).
13
See Terry M. Moe, The Presidency and the Bureaucracy: The Presidential Advantage,
in THE PRESIDENCY AND THE POLITICAL SYSTEM 425, 442 (Michael Nelson ed., 2003) (arguing
that reelection-oriented legislators have scant incentive to participate in oversight activities);
see also MORRIS S. OGUL, CONGRESS OVERSEES THE BUREAUCRACY: STUDIES IN LEGISLATIVE
SUPERVISION 182 (1976) (finding that legislators devote little time to preparing for or participating in oversight hearings).
14
MANN & ORNSTEIN, supra note 9, at 170.
15
Id. at 215.
16
Compare JOEL D. ABERBACH, KEEPING A WATCHFUL EYE: THE POLITICS OF CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT 31 (1990) (reelection-oriented members of Congress have few incentives
to oversee administrative agencies), and Seymour Scher, Conditions for Legislative Control,
25 J. POL. 525, 533–34 (1963) (close ties among agencies, subcommittees, and interest groups
block vigorous oversight), with Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional
Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 166, 176
(1984) (Congress designs agency procedures so that agencies will be responsive to individual
citizens and interest groups, thereby requiring direct congressional oversight only in limited
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congressional ex post control is the subject of such vigorous debate, when
coupled with Congress’s willingness to relinquish significant ex ante policymaking powers, suggests a branch in retreat.
With Congress in sustained withdrawal from its historic position at the
helm of the policy-making process, the White House has more than filled the
void. Recent presidents have developed a set of control mechanisms that are
largely unchallenged by the courts and unmatched by Congress.17 Most notably, the use of executive orders to set important administrative policies has
been on the rise, in fits and starts, since the New Deal era.18 The development in the 1980s and 1990s of a process by which the White
House–directed Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) could
reject proposed regulations that failed OIRA’s cost-benefit analyses further
strengthened presidential control of administration.19 In summary, Congress’s delegations of policy-making authority to the administrative state, its
inconsistent ex post monitoring of those delegations, and the White House’s
inroads into these traditional Article I functions all raise serious concerns
regarding whether Congress has relinquished its role as national lawmaker.
B. Public Attitudes
As previously mentioned, popular perceptions of Congress are strongly
negative.20 Public trust in Congress is in the midst of a long-term decline,
with only the occasional, temporary uptick.21 Although public disapproval
of Congress’s job performance is by no means a contemporary development,
recent polling concerning public confidence in the institution retains its ability to shock.22 For instance, a national survey of likely voters conducted in
August 2012 found that only eight percent of respondents rated Congress’s

circumstances), and Barry R. Weingast & Mark J. Moran, Bureaucratic or Congressional
Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission, 91 J. POL. ECON. 765,
769 (1983) (arguing that the budget and reauthorization processes provide subcommittees with
the carrots and sticks needed for effective oversight).
17
See generally ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE MADISONIAN REPUBLIC (2010); Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113
HARV. L. REV. 633 (2000); Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J.
1725 (1996); Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2001).
18
See Terry M. Moe & William G. Howell, The Presidential Power of Unilateral Action,
15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 132, 133 (1999) (noting the increased use of executive orders as a
policy-making device).
19
See Kagan, supra note 17, at 2277–81, 2285–90.
20
See JOHN R. HIBBING & ELIZABETH THEISS-MORSE, CONGRESS AS PUBLIC ENEMY: PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD AMERICAN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS (1995).
21
See John R. Hibbing & Christopher W. Larimer, What the American Public Wants Congress to Be, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 45, 46–48 (Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I. Oppenheimer eds., 8th ed. 2005).
22
Lydia Saad, Congress Approval Remains Historically Low, Now 16%, GALLUP POL.
(July 13, 2012), http://www.gallup.com/poll/155720/congress-approval-remains-historicallylow.aspx (contrasting a recent poll showing that thirteen percent of Americans approve of what
Congress is doing, with a historical average of thirty-three percent since 1974).
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performance as good or excellent, with sixty-four percent labeling it as
poor.23
Yet, despite perennially low public approval of Congress as an institution, the overwhelming majority of incumbents are consistently reelected.24
Political scientists have even determined that incumbents qua incumbents
receive an electoral advantage of approximately seven to ten percentage
points.25 Coming full circle, many of these incumbents “run for Congress by
running against Congress,” tapping into their constituents’ deep dislike of an
institution to which these candidates seek to return.26
C. The Dangers of an Enfeebled Congress
These dual declines in Congress’s institutional capacity and public approval are troubling. If left unchecked, they will severely diminish the legislative branch’s role in governance. This weakening of Congress, in turn,
could have ripple effects, damaging both the efficacy and the democratic
nature of American government.
For instance, a reduced congressional role in governance may be associated with later policy failures. In the short term, Congress’s refusal or inability to perform its prescribed role in lawmaking arguably leads to suboptimal
outcomes. A set of Congress scholars at the Brookings Institution argues
that Congress’s disinterest in the details of new policy proposals stymies preenactment cost-benefit analyses of major expenditures and that its lack of
engagement in executive branch oversight is linked to recent missteps in Iraq
and homeland security policies.27 In the longer term, congressional pathologies may gradually bleed into other areas of public life. The institution’s
hyperpartisan atmosphere may contribute to (as well as reflect) the increasingly rancorous tone of debates in the public square, and perceptions of its
dysfunctional nature may affect public opinion concerning other institutions—a potentially dangerous dynamic in a democracy, where a certain degree of trust and engagement are needed for civil society to function.
If one expands the time horizon still further, a continued decline in
Congress’s role in governance could put our separation-of-powers system at
risk. With some significant judicial checks on the executive resting on the
presence or absence of legislative action, congressional silence could trigger

23
8% Think Congress Is Doing A Good Job, RASMUSSEN REP. (Aug. 27, 2012), http://
www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/archive/mood_of_america_archive/congressional_
performance/8_think_congress_is_doing_a_good_job.
24
See GARY C. JACOBSON, THE POLITICS OF CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS 27 (7th ed.
2009).
25
See Steven Ansolabehere, James Snyder & Charles Stewart III, Old Voters, New Voters,
and the Personal Vote: Using Redistricting to Measure the Incumbency Advantage, 44 AM. J.
POL. SCI. 17, 17 (2000).
26
RICHARD F. FENNO, HOME STYLE: HOUSE MEMBERS IN THEIR DISTRICTS 168 (1978).
27
Sarah A. Binder, Thomas E. Mann, Norman J. Ornstein & Molly Reynolds, Assessing
the 100th Congress, Anticipating the 111th, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (Jan. 8, 2009), http://
www.brookings.edu/papers/2009/0108_broken_branch_binder_mann.aspx.

\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLP\7-1\HLP106.txt

144

unknown

Seq: 6

Harvard Law & Policy Review

5-MAR-13

13:40

[Vol. 7

a chain reaction, in which judicial or other checks on the executive branch
are weakened as a direct effect of Congress’s inaction.28 Given the importance that separated institutions play as a bulwark against tyranny,29 such a
development would be troubling.
II. A REFORM AGENDA
A. The Proposal
To address these concerns, this article advocates a proposed change that
may be stated in one sentence: replace the current House of Representatives
committee assignment process, which involves elements of both party influence and member self-selection,30 with a regime in which legislators are assigned to committees via a random draw.31 Despite its simplicity, this
proposal could lead to dramatic and highly positive changes in Congress’s
internal capacity and its relations with the other branches, as I will show in
Parts III–V of this article.
Random assignment of committee portfolios is a new application of a
very old idea: sortition, or the selection of policy makers via lottery. Aristotle endorsed “the appointment of magistrates by lot” as more “democratic” than direct elections.32 Legislative and administrative bodies in
ancient Athens were chosen via lottery-like processes.33 In recent years, institutional design scholars concerned with interest group capture and other
issues similar to those that animate my proposal have promoted sortition in
additional governance contexts, from the use of random-sample polling to
create policy,34 to the use of a lottery model for legislative elections.35

28
See Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984) (deferring
to agencies’ “permissible” interpretations of the agencies’ organic statutes unless “Congress
has directly spoken to the precise question at issue”); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S.
654, 678–79 (1981) (permitting the President to suspend civil claims against a foreign state
without statutory authorization, given the “history of congressional acquiescence in conduct of
the sort engaged in by the President”); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (basing the constitutionality of presidential action on
the extent to which Congress expressly condones or condemns the action, or remains silent).
29
See 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *149 (“The total union of [governmental
functions] . . . would be productive of tyranny.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison)
(arguing that the Constitution’s institutional design provides an “auxiliary precaution[ ]” that
“oblige[s] . . . [the government] to control itself”).
30
See infra Part III.
31
This proposal focuses on the House of Representatives. Although many of the contentions in this article to some degree could apply to the Senate, my emphasis is on the House for
purposes of analytic simplicity.
32
ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS 94–95 (Stephen Everson ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988).
33
See JAMES WYCLIFFE HEADLAM, ELECTION BY LOT AT ATHENS 173 (2d ed. 1933).
34
See generally JAMES FISHKIN, WHEN THE PEOPLE SPEAK: DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY
AND PUBLIC CONSULTATION (2009).
35
See Akhil Reed Amar, Lottery Voting: A Thought Experiment, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
193, 194–95 (1995) (describing a lottery model for legislative elections).
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One could imagine a “pure” version of this proposal, in which committee portfolios are both random and temporary, involving biennial reassignments, for instance. Short-term assignments could augment some of the
proposal’s positive effects, particularly concerning deliberation and secondorder diversity. On the other hand, frequent reassignments could prevent
legislators from gaining mastery over any one issue area, wiping away committees’ institutional memories every two years and potentially increasing
Congress’s reliance on outside interest groups as an alternative source of
expertise. While this article does not take a position regarding the optimal
length of committee assignments, one must note that any temporal limit selected will carry with it attendant costs and benefits.
B. Assumptions
Before discussing the prospective effects of this proposal, I note several
assumptions. Most significantly, I assume that legislators who are randomly
assigned a given committee portfolio would tend to invest their lawmaking
efforts in their committees’ issue areas. The basic logic undergirding much
of this article holds that since committees enjoy some degree of property
rights concerning bills within their jurisdictions,36 if legislators are to have
any influence at all over lawmaking, they will channel the bulk of their legislative efforts into committee work. This assumption can be unpacked into
three component parts: (1) members of Congress are interested in legislating; (2) much of Congress’s legislative activity occurs in committee; and (3)
if Congress were to implement a random assignment system, (1) and (2)
would still hold. With the validity of this logical chain being central to my
argument, I address each of these components in greater detail.
First, given the dysfunction within Congress and public cynicism regarding the institution, it is understandable that the basic, seemingly tautological statement that “legislators are interested in legislating” is
controversial. There is little room for legislative work, after all, in David
Mayhew’s conception of legislators as “single-minded seekers of reelection,” who concentrate on advertising, position-taking, and credit-claiming
functions to achieve this goal.37 Yet in pursuing their reelection imperative,
members may find legislative work to be a necessary means to this end.
Even if low-information voters do not directly follow their representative’s
legislative efforts, organized groups—e.g., unions, churches, etc.—with connections to those voters closely monitor Hill activities, and their statements
and endorsements provide signals to aligned voters.38 Moreover, the need
for campaign contributions may compel reelection-oriented members to pur36
See Barry R. Weingast & William J. Marshall, The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets, 96 J. POL. ECON. 132,
157 (1988).
37
See DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 5 (1974).
38
See R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE LOGIC OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 66 (1990); JOHN W.
KINGDON, CONGRESSMEN’S VOTING DECISIONS 155 (2d ed. 1981).
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sue at least some legislative work, as politically sophisticated donors may
not be fooled by substance-free posturing, instead choosing to support those
lawmakers whom they determine are effective at advancing donors’ legislative agendas. Moving beyond this reelection goal, other scholars note that a
desire for power and the achievement of policy goals also motivate legislators.39 These additional goals are closely connected to lawmaking
functions.40
Second, the claim that committees play a central role in much of Congress’s legislative activity is well-documented.41 As an initial matter, committee members serve as agenda-setters, determining to a significant degree
which issues Congress will consider.42 Once an issue is placed on the
agenda, committee members expend time and resources drafting bills in
markup sessions.43 After a bill is sent to the floor, the Rules Committee may
impose special rules restricting further changes, which ensures that the final
version closely resembles the committee-produced version.44 Finally, committee members often dominate conference committees, providing committees with an effective ex post veto on disfavored floor changes.45
Third, the final premise states that, should this proposed switch to a
random assignment system be enacted, members would continue to find it in
their interest to pursue their legislative goals through the committee system.
Following such a switch, many legislators would find themselves on committees that lie far from their substantive interests. These legislators would
be faced with a choice: either pursue their legislative goals through their
committee assignments or have virtually no influence on the content of committee-produced bills. Between the Scylla of legislative influence on an issue area that is, in expectation, less relevant to district interests and the
Charybdis of no direct influence at all over lawmaking, I assume that most
legislators would prefer the former.
The experience of former Rep. Shirley Chisholm (D-NY) provides an
example of the rationale behind this third premise. When Chisholm was first
elected to Congress, she was assigned to the Agriculture Committee and its
Forestry Subcommittee. Given that she represented a district in Brooklyn,

39
See generally RICHARD F. FENNO, JR., CONGRESSMEN IN COMMITTEES 1 (1973); ERIC
SCHICKLER, DISJOINTED PLURALISM: INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF
THE U.S. CONGRESS (2001).
40
Cf. GREGORY WAWRO, LEGISLATIVE ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (2000) (providing numerous examples of legislators, with these motivations, investing significant time and energy into large-scale, highly consequential legislation).
41
See RICHARD L. HALL, PARTICIPATION IN CONGRESS 21 (1996).
42
See Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast, The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power, 81 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 85, 85 (1987).
43
See HALL, supra note 41, at 27.
44
See Douglas Dion & John D. Huber, Procedural Choice and the House Committee on
Rules, 58 J. POL. 25, 25 (1996).
45
See Shepsle & Weingast, supra note 42, at 86.
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she was understandably unhappy with this assignment.46 With no better option available—until her successful transfer to another committee in a later
Congress—she decided to devote her energies to lawmaking within the Agriculture Committee’s jurisdiction.47 According to her colleague Rep. Patsy
Mink (D-HI):
It was with great dismay that she felt she was being . . . relegated
[to] a position on a committee which was of no interest to her.
She took it well, castigated the leadership on her side for having
made this appointment, and then proceeded to take charge of that
committee . . . . [Chisholm] soon found out that food stamps was
in the . . . [Committee’s jurisdiction] and just sort of revolutionized the whole approach of helping poor people with the food
stamp program.48
Essentially, this third premise generalizes from Chisholm’s experience.
Although legislators may devote less attention to lawmaking under this system—as legislative achievements in an area that is less relevant to one’s
district offer lower returns—I presume that they will still engage in some
significant amount of lawmaking activity, as did Chisholm, because such
activity would continue to serve the electoral, power, and policy goals described above.
In drawing inferences from Chisholm’s experience, one must proceed
with caution. Her experience receiving such a disfavored assignment is
highly unusual, and her reaction to it may say more about her than the typical member of Congress.49 In the longer term, though, one could imagine
that a random assignment system could alter the composition of Congress,
with less civic-minded, more pork barrel-oriented politicians being discouraged from running for an office with no guarantees regarding specific committee assignments. In this way, the proposal’s effectiveness not only
depends on, but also influences, the characteristics of members of Congress.
Still, I caution that, in the absence of other evidence, claims regarding the
amount of effort that legislators would put into their randomly assigned
committee portfolios are speculative.
It is important to acknowledge that if one does not agree with any of
these three premises, one will find many of the arguments in this article less
convincing. Although (1) and (2) are informed by well-recognized scholarly
literature, and (3) has a firm logical basis, these three statements are assumptions, not uncontested facts. Thus, as with many positive and normative

46
SHIRLEY CHISHOLM, UNBOUGHT AND UNBOSSED 84 (1970) (“[I]t would be hard to
imagine an assignment that is less relevant to my background or to the needs of the . . . people
who elected me.”).
47
See 147 CONG. REC. 10,344 (2001).
48
Id.
49
See James Barron, Shirley Chisholm, ‘Unbossed’ Pioneer in Congress, Is Dead at 80,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2005, at A1 (obituary noting Chisholm’s achievements).
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claims, the arguments presented here rest in part on a set of arguably unfalsifiable assumptions.
III. COMMITTEE REFORM

AND

CONGRESSIONAL CAPACITY

Having described the basic contours of my proposal, I turn to examining the proposal’s potential impact on Congress. Random assignment of legislators to committees could enhance Congress’s lawmaking capacity,
thereby mitigating or reversing some of the troubling trends described
above. This part shows how this reform could advance five significant, positive changes in Congress. These potential benefits involve (a) decreasing the
power that party leaders have over their rank-and-file members, (b) providing for committees that are both expert and representative, (c) mitigating
interest group capture, (d) promoting deliberation, and (e) providing a
greater voice for minority viewpoints. A final subpart (f) discusses the possibility that this reform will lead to higher legislative enactment costs.
A. Democratic Responsiveness and Partisan Polarization
Currently, party leaders play a prominent role in doling out committee
assignments to their rank-and-file members.50 Given the benefits associated
with a seat on a favored committee,51 this influence over the assignment
process provides party leaders with a sizable inducement to encourage members’ loyalty on roll call votes.52 Consequently, party influence over committee assignments distorts legislative outcomes away from what one might
expect in a legislature conforming to the democratic ideal, where all members’ views are assigned equal weight.53 Hence, a reform that reduces party
leaders’ power could increase Congress’s democratic responsiveness.
Currently, two party-led organs, the Democratic Caucus Steering &
Policy Committee and the Republican Conference Steering Committee, exercise substantial control over the committee seat assignment process, with
both organizations valuing party loyalty—sometimes above all else54—in
50

See GARY W. COX & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, LEGISLATIVE LEVIATHAN: PARTY GOVHOUSE 164 (1993).
51
For example: being able to serve district-specific interests, collect donations from
groups affected by programs within the committee’s turf, or pursue one’s own policy goals.
52
See COX & MCCUBBINS, supra note 50, at 174.
53
This statement assumes that party leaders’ preferences deviate from those of the rank
and file. See, e.g., Steven Ansolabehere, James Snyder, Jr. & Charles Stewart III, The Effects
of Party and Preferences on Congressional Roll-Call Voting, 26 LEG. STUD. Q. 533, 552
(2001).
54
See, e.g., John H. Aldrich & David W. Rohde, The Republican Revolution and the
House Appropriations Committee, 62 J. POL. 1, 4–12 (2000) (detailing how Speaker Newt
Gingrich (R-GA) awarded the chairmanship of the powerful Ways & Means Committee to a
long-time loyalist, bypassing the four most senior committee members, and appointed an unusually large contingent of newly elected, ideologically driven Republicans to the committee
as a reward for their pledged loyalty to Gingrich’s agenda).
ERNMENT IN THE
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doling out plum assignments.55 Party leaders’ ability to assign committee
portfolios and chair or ranking-member positions to their fellow partisans is
a significant carrot that party leaders use to induce loyalty from their rankand-file members.56
Party leaders’ use of the committee assignment process for partisan aggrandizement distorts the democratic responsiveness of Congress in two
ways. First, since parties take into account member fundraising when determining committee assignments, the current assignment system helps solidify
the role of money in congressional politics. “With the demise of seniority,”
Thomas Mann and Norman Ornstein write, “aspiring committee and subcommittee chairs were obliged to raise large sums of campaign funds just to
be considered for the posts they sought.”57 Eleanor Powell has shown that
member-to-member giving is correlated with the advancement of legislators’
careers, including assignments and leadership positions on sought-after committees.58 A 2007 memo from the Democratic Congressional Campaign
Committee to Democratic representatives all but announced the quid pro quo
nature of the connection between party fundraising and the retention of committee leadership positions.59 The memo stated that “dues” of up to
$500,000 would be collected from Democratic representatives holding committee or party leadership positions.60 Similarly, the National Republican
Congressional Committee encourages Republican committee leaders to sign
“commitment contracts,” where the dollar amount varies based on the desirability of one’s committee assignments and any committee leadership positions that one holds.61 If one believes that money corrupts congressional
politics,62 breaking the connection between fundraising and committee assignments would be a step in the right direction.
Second, the current, party-led committee assignment system pulls
members away from their district or personal preferences and towards those
of party leaders. Given the intense competition for the most desired committee portfolios,63 party leaders controlling the assignment process enjoy a significant source of leverage over rank-and-file members. To the extent that
party leaders use this leverage to pressure members to vote the party line,
party influence over the committee system may contribute to partisan polari-

55
See generally DAVID W. ROHDE, PARTIES AND LEADERS IN THE POSTREFORM HOUSE
(1991).
56
See COX & MCCUBBINS, supra note 50, at 166.
57
MANN & ORNSTEIN, supra note 9, at 180.
58
Eleanor Powell, Partisan Entrepreneurship and Career Advancement in Congress 14
(2009) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University) (on file with Pusey Library,
Harvard University).
59
See MARIAN CURRINDER, MONEY IN THE HOUSE: CAMPAIGN FUNDS AND CONGRESSIONAL PARTY POLITICS 36–38 (2008).
60
Id. at 37.
61
Id.
62
See generally LESSIG, supra note 7.
63
See Weingast & Marshall, supra note 36.
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zation.64 Thus, freeing the committee assignment process from party influence could decrease polarization in the chamber and relax some of the
pressure on moderate legislators to place party interests above district or
personal preferences.65
Critics of my proposal may argue that partisan pressure on rank-andfile legislators is actually a normative good and that, by vitiating congressional parties, my proposal would decrease officeholder accountability. This
critique is rooted in a theory labeled “responsible party government,” which
holds that strong parties and clear lines of authority allow low-information
voters to accurately reward or punish officeholders for policy outcomes by
using officeholders’ party identifications as cues.66 By placing committee
assignments partially in the hands of party leaders, the current system increases party control of the often unwieldy legislative branch, facilitating
both centralized, party-led governance and citizens’ ability to reward or
sanction the majority party for outcomes. In this way, a system in which the
majority party influences the committee assignment process enables voters
to exercise some degree of indirect control over committee work product.
By severing this link, this critique continues, random assignment may make
it more difficult for voters to assign responsibility for policy outcomes.67
This potential drawback to random assignment deserves consideration.
To evaluate its importance, one must examine both the desirability of responsible party government—a normative goal that many readers may not
share—and its feasibility absent my proposal. On this latter consideration, I
do not believe that my proposal would impose much of an additional impediment to the development of responsible party government. Given the historically local nature of House elections,68 voters’ propensity to select
divided party government,69 and the structural barriers that bicameralism and
separation of powers present to the implementation of responsible party government, this proposal is unlikely to appreciably reduce the likelihood of a
responsible party government system developing.70
A balancing of this potential negative consequence against the aforementioned likely positive consequences favors enacting the proposal. On
64
For an overview of partisan polarization and its ill effects in Congress, see THOMAS E.
MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, IT’S EVEN WORSE THAN IT LOOKS: HOW THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM COLLIDED WITH THE NEW POLITICS OF EXTREMISM 3–106 (2012).
65
See Ansolabehere, Snyder & Stewart, supra note 53.
66
See GARY W. COX & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, SETTING THE AGENDA: RESPONSIBLE
PARTY GOVERNMENT IN THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 1–2 (2005); V.O. KEY, JR.,
POLITICS, PARTIES AND PRESSURE GROUPS 199–227 (5th ed. 1964); E. E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER,
PARTY GOVERNMENT 65–98 (1942).
67
Cf. Jacob E. Gersen, Unbundled Powers, 96 VA. L. REV. 301, 328 (2010) (noting the
connection between centralization of responsibility and democratic accountability).
68
See generally Richard F. Fenno, Jr., U.S. House Members in Their Constituencies: An
Exploration, 71 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 883 (1977).
69
See generally BARRY C. BURDEN & DAVID C. KIMBALL, WHY AMERICANS SPLIT THEIR
TICKETS: CAMPAIGNS, COMPETITION, AND DIVIDED GOVERNMENT (2004).
70
See James L. Sundquist, Needed: A Political Theory for the New Era of Coalition Government in the United States, 103 POL. SCI. Q. 613, 614 (1988) (discussing the persistent
inapplicability of responsible party government theory to American politics).
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one side of the ledger is the argument that weakening congressional parties
may move American politics a step farther from some observers’ goal of
responsible party government—an as-yet-unattained objective that, despite
over one hundred years of elite promotion, voters have consistently rejected.71 Placed on the other side are more concrete, likely effects concerning the removal of a source of pressure for legislators to vote with their
party, rather than, for example, their conscience or district preferences, and
the cession of the pay-for-play practice of legislators being assessed party
“dues” based on the value of their committee assignments and leadership
positions. Given this balance, I argue that the proposal’s likely positive effects outweigh its potential to add another barrier to the future establishment
of responsible party government.
B. The Expertise-Representativeness Tradeoff
Congress scholars have long recognized a tradeoff between committees
that have expertise in their jurisdictions and those that are representative of
the larger chamber.72 Committees need some incentive—e.g., “jurisdictional property rights,” or the near-exclusive ability to propose legislation
within a specified issue area—to exert effort to gain the subject-matter expertise needed to produce high-quality information for the chamber.73 But
those legislators for whom property rights are most valuable—and those
who are most interested in joining a given committee—likely will hold
views on issues within that committee’s purview that differ markedly from
those of the median legislator.74 For instance, legislators from districts with
military bases are more likely to be interested in serving on the Armed Services Committee,75 arguably leading to the drafting of defense bills that are
unrepresentative of the floor. Thus, institutional designers face a dilemma

71

See BURDEN & KIMBALL, supra note 69; Sundquist, supra note 70.
See, e.g., Thomas W. Gilligan & Keith Krehbiel, Organization of Informative Committees by a Rational Legislature, 34 AM. J. POL. SCI. 531 (1990).
73
See KEITH KREHBIEL, INFORMATION AND LEGISLATIVE ORGANIZATION 61–103 (1991).
74
See Barry S. Rundquist & John A. Ferejohn, Observations on a Distributive Theory of
Policy-Making: Two American Expenditure Programs Compared, in COMPARATIVE PUBLIC
POLICY: ISSUES, THEORIES AND METHODS 87, 88 (Craig Liske, William Loehr & John McCamant eds., 1975) (“[C]ongressmen are motivated to serve the economic interests of their constituencies, . . . [which they are best able to do] if they are members of standing committees
with jurisdiction over government activities that affect their constituencies.”). As a result,
some committees are comprised of “homogenous high-demanders” of the policies within
those committees’ jurisdictions. Id.
In some limited instances, one could conceive of committees comprised of expert legislators
that are not unrepresentative of the floor, for example, former lawyers are overrepresented on
the Judiciary Committee, but there is little reason to expect a priori that this form of expertise
would be associated with unrepresentative preferences.
75
E. Scott Adler & John S. Lapinski, Demand-Side Theory and Congressional Committee
Composition: A Constituency Characteristics Approach, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 895, 901 (1997).
72
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between maximizing committee expertise and maximizing committee
representativeness.76
Random assignment of members to committees could help optimize
this balance. With this reform, the ideological composition of any given
committee’s membership would, in expectation, accurately mirror that of the
floor. Since members’ primary means of influencing legislation is through
their committee assignments, members would be compelled to focus their
efforts on the areas of their assignments, if they are to have influence in the
chamber at all.
How prevalent are unrepresentative committees? Gary Cox and
Mathew McCubbins have suggested that only a select number of committees
focus on policies with geographically concentrated benefits and costs.77 To
continue with the previous example, this critique notes that many committees address policies with less concentrated benefits than does the Armed
Services Committee and therefore may be expected to attract a broader
cross-section of lawmakers. Phrased another way, if most legislators’ districts have roughly equal “demand” for tax policy or appropriations, for example, then there is little reason to expect appreciable differences among
those members that self-select onto, respectively, the Ways & Means and
Appropriations committees.78 If accurate, this contention would cast doubt
on the magnitude of the expertise-representativeness tradeoff discussed
above, and the aforementioned benefits of random assignment to mitigating
the expertise-representativeness tradeoff would be illusory.
Empirical evidence of the extent to which committees are unrepresentative is mixed. On the one hand, analysis of members’ roll call voting behavior and seat assignments demonstrates that, concerning the most
consequential committees—i.e., Ways & Means, Appropriations, and
Rules—party loyalty better explains seat assignments than does distributive
theory, the political science theory that is most closely associated with the
notion that committees are comprised of homogenous high-demanders of
committee-related policies.79 On the other hand, research connecting the
demographic profiles of congressional districts with their legislators’ seat assignments reveals a persistent connection between district characteristics and
committee portfolios for eight committees, as well an occasional connection
for another two committees.80

76
See generally Richard L. Hall, Empiricism and Progress in Positive Theories of Legislative Institutions, in POSITIVE THEORIES OF CONGRESSIONAL INSTITUTIONS 286, 295–96 (Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast eds., 1995).
77
See COX & MCCUBBINS, supra note 50, at 224.
78
See id. at 203–19 (noting that the Democratic members of committees with more uniform externalities tend to be more representative of Democratic floor preferences than are the
Democratic members of committees with targeted externalities).
79
See KREHBIEL, supra note 73, at 150.
80
See Adler & Lapinski, supra note 75, at 913. These eight are Agriculture; Armed Services; Banking, Finance & Urban Affairs; Education & Labor; Foreign Affairs; Interior &
Insular Affairs; Merchant Marine & Fisheries; and Public Works. The two committees for
which the authors found a less-consistent link are the Energy & Commerce and Judiciary
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For the purposes of this article, it is not necessary to assess the validity
of these competing distributive and party-cartel perspectives on committee
organization, as random assignment would improve the functioning of committees under both theories. For those committees currently comprised of
homogenous high-demanders, a transition to random assignment would mitigate the expertise-representativeness tradeoff discussed above. For committees whose members are chosen primarily on the basis of party loyalty,
switching to a random assignment system would engender the advantages
discussed in Part III.A, supra. Finally, those committees that currently are
organized via a mix of self- and party-selection—leading to dual forms of
bias, with the effects of each being diluted—may enjoy both benefits.
C. Interest Group Capture
A random assignment system may discourage interest group capture of
discrete policy areas, in which an entrenched “iron triangle” consisting of
special interest groups, agencies, and legislators on the relevant subcommittees exercise outsized influence over a given issue area. The current committee assignment system makes committees particularly susceptible to
interest group capture.81 As previously detailed, legislators currently have
considerable discretion in selecting their committee portfolios, with party
organizations also playing a significant role. This partial self-selection—and
consequent overrepresentation of “high-demanders” on certain committees82—can exacerbate interest group capture.83
To see how committee self-selection facilitates interest group capture,
consider the following hypothetical. The median member of Congress
wishes to spend $1 billion on a new weapons system; the median legislator
representing a district with a sizable military or defense-industry presence,
with constituents who tend to be more hawkish, wishes to spend $2 billion;
and the defense contractor is lobbying Congress to spend $3 billion on the
project. The most cost-effective lobbying strategy for the contractor may be
to focus its resources on these more hawkish legislators, since the “cost” of
moving them from their ideal point to the contractor’s preferred outcome is
lower than that for other legislators. With self-selection onto committees,
these hawkish legislators will gravitate towards the Armed Services Committee. The result is a tighter committee–interest group nexus than would be
committees. Id. Note that some of these committees have altered their names or jurisdictions,
or have been disbanded entirely, since the period under study.
81
See Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48
ARK. L. REV. 23, 84 (1995).
82
See Adler & Lapinski, supra note 75, at 913 (demonstrating that legislators hailing from
districts with a high demand for a given policy tend to be overrepresented on committees with
jurisdiction over those policies).
83
See Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 42 (1991) (“Because, compared to other legislators, committee members have more influence over legislation germane to their committees, the committee
structure can help an interest group with political dominance in a single district extend its
influence across the entire . . . nation.”).
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the case with random assignment. Thus, to the extent that interest group
priorities are aligned with district-specific interests, self-selection of a relatively homogenous group of legislators onto committees lowers the costs to
certain interest groups of capturing congressional policy in a given committee’s domain.
Random assignment of members to committees would end the practice
of “high-demanders” self-selecting onto committees with jurisdiction over
their favored issue area. This change, in turn, would raise the costs to interest groups of influencing committees, which, in expectation, would be comprised of a mix of sympathetic and unsympathetic members, mirroring the
views of the parent chamber. In this way, random assignment would discourage interest group capture.
D. Deliberation
The prevailing wisdom holds that the legislative branch is moving further away from the deliberative ideal.84 Among Congress-watchers, anecdotes suggesting a growing incivility in Congress abound.85 According to
one recent study, twenty-seven percent of congressional press releases include partisan “taunting.”86 With Congress’s freedom of speech or debate
being a key element of the institution’s “soft,” persuasive powers, the dysfunctional nature of congressional speech may inhibit the branch’s ability to
engage with and persuade the public.87
Could random assignment to committees encourage greater deliberation? Possibly. Proponents of deliberation contend that interactions between ideologically dissimilar individuals can lead to compromise and the
reexamination of more extreme views.88 Random assignment would compel
legislators with different views and backgrounds to interact with each other
and, if they are to achieve anything, work together. One can contrast this
possibility with the status quo, in which members from similar districts and
personal backgrounds cluster on similar committees, and the potential gains
from deliberation are not realized.

84

See, e.g., MANN & ORNSTEIN, supra note 9, at 216.
See, e.g., Alan K. Ota, Liriel Higa & Siobhan Hughes, Fracas in Ways and Means
Overshadows Approval of Pension Overhaul Measure, CQ WKLY., July 19, 2003, at 1822,
1822 (reporting that Rep. Pete Stark (D-CA) called a Republican colleague a “wimp” and a
“little fruitcake” during a committee hearing); Patrick Reis, Witness to Rep. Young: ‘I Pay
Your Salary,’ POLITICO (Nov. 18, 2011, 7:00 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1111/
68725.html (reporting that Rep. Don Young (R-AK) referred to historian Douglas Brinkley’s
witness testimony as “garbage” while questioning Brinkley during a committee hearing).
86
Justin Grimmer & Gary King, General Purpose Computer-Assisted Clustering and
Conceptualization, 108 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 2643, 2649 (2011).
87
See Chafetz, supra note 8, at 722.
88
See Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE
L.J. 71, 103–04 (2000) (“If Republicans are speaking mostly with Republicans, and if Democrats are speaking mostly with Democrats, one should expect a hardening of views toward the
more extreme points.”).
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E. Minority Viewpoints
Random assignment may also provide a greater voice to currently underrepresented political minorities in Congress. In assessing this proposal’s
potential effect on promoting minority views, it is helpful to adopt Heather
Gerken’s dual forms of diversity, which she terms first- and second-order
diversity.89 First-order diversity involves greater statistical parity, in which
the composition of samples more closely reflects that of the larger population.90 Second-order diversity involves a variety of samples, which, according to Gerken, “do not mirror the underlying population, but instead
encompass a wide range of compositions.”91
Concerning first-order diversity, the potential effects of this proposal
are fairly straightforward. The proposal would end the practice of skewing
partisan ratios on committees in favor of the majority party.92 These skewed
ratios are an intentional violation of first-order diversity principles, potentially censoring the views heard in committee hearings and bill markups to
the detriment of the minority party.
While this proposal would block committee packing by the majority
party by tending to align committee and chamber preferences, these preferences would be identical only in expectation. In practice, one is still likely
to see nontrivial divergence between committee and chamber views. Although, in expectation, the proposal would lead to committees that perfectly
mirror the floor’s preferences, there is obviously variance in the frequency
distribution associated with a series of random draws. Democrats would be
overrepresented on some committees, Republicans on others; female legislators would enjoy disproportionate influence on some committees, male legislators on others; and so on. Under the current assignment system, the
influence of parties in the assignment process provides a backstop against
the possibility of extreme divergence, as party leaders may take action to
ensure that committee skewness is kept within some acceptable bounds.
Under my random draw proposal, however, no such backstop would exist.
Therefore, my proposal might lead to some committees for which committee-floor preference divergence is greater than it would have been under the
current system.
This divergence—the natural consequence of a random draw, rather
than a deliberate distortion by party leaders or self-selecting legislators—
would foster a form of second-order diversity. Specifically, a system in
which political minorities are privileged on some committees and underrepresented on others could lead to a beneficial form of interorganizational

89

See Heather K. Gerken, Second-Order Diversity, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1099 (2005).
Id. at 1102.
91
Id.
92
See generally LORRAINE H. TONG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 40478, HOUSE COMMITTEE PARTY RATIOS: 98TH–111TH CONGRESSES (2009) (showing a consistent practice of the
majority party maintaining stronger majorities in committees than in the chamber as a whole).
90
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diversity.93 This second-order diversity could lead to many of the same benefits in Congress that Gerken contends would stem from greater secondorder diversity within larger, societal-level institutions.94
Whether one favors providing greater voice to political minorities often
depends, however, on which political minorities one believes have been unduly excluded from the process—and which minority views one believes
ought to be marginalized. For instance, would a more eclectic set of oversight-and-investigations subcommittee memberships be a net positive if it
also increases the likelihood that a future Joseph McCarthy would rise to
prominence on one of these bodies?95 Consider that, under the current assignment process, parties may at least exert some amount of influence to
relegate such persons to the sidelines. By contrast, my proposal would allow
no such role for parties.
In evaluating whether the empowerment of political minorities under
this proposal is a net positive or negative, one must consider whether the risk
of potentially placing a small number (in expectation) of key policy areas
under the jurisdiction of ideologically unrepresentative legislators outweighs
the aforementioned advantages. For all of the reasons discussed above, I
believe that the benefits to this proposal are worth this added political risk.
F. Legislative Enactment Costs
Random assignment also raises the possibility of higher legislative enactment costs. Committee members’ autonomy from their colleagues under
this proposal suggests that the parent chamber or party caucus would be
unable to control a wayward committee. With random assignment, some
committees likely would be comprised of members that are neither representative of, nor responsive to, the preferences of the overall legislative branch.
In this way, the proposal could weaken the principal-agent relationship between chamber and committee.
In these instances, random assignment could lead to adverse consequences concerning both of the two primary functions that committees
perform: gathering information and drafting legislation. First, an unrepresentative committee could strategically withhold information when it believes that its legislative principal would use this information in a manner

93

See Gerken, supra note 89, at 1102–03.
See id. at 1104–05.
95
More generally, consider the possibility that a random draw will empower ideological
outliers that a party-influenced assignment process would have taken steps to marginalize. The
leptokurtic distribution of committee preferences under a random assignment system suggests
that much of the variance under this proposal would be due to extreme—but infrequent—
deviations, whereas much of the variance under the status quo would be attributable to more
moderate—but more frequent—deviations. Essentially, one can view this proposal as involving a mean-variance tradeoff: more representative committees in expectation, along with empowering political minorities in certain instances.
94
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that the committee opposes.96 While this strategic censoring should be a
concern regardless of the mechanism by which committee members are selected,97 it may be that committee members who do not depend on their
House colleagues for their positions—as in this proposal—might be more
brazen about censoring information from their nominal principals.
Second, committees with preferences that diverge from those of the
floor may be able to move bills towards their own preferences and away
from those of the parent chamber to a greater extent than under the status
quo. To see why this might be the case, note that, under the current regime,
other members of Congress retain some influence over the assignment process. This influence enables them to maintain some degree of leverage over
committee legislative products. A switch to random selection would deprive
extracommittee actors of this source of leverage, potentially encouraging
committee members to use their power for countermajoritarian purposes.
Nonetheless, committees would not be truly autonomous under this
proposal because the discharge petition gives an outlet to floor majorities in
such situations, and thereby may provide a check on committees as independent agents.98 Successfully marshaling support for discharge petitions involves incurring substantial costs,99 however, which may limit their use.
Given these costs involved in bypassing committee gatekeepers, one may
say that, while random assignment would not leave committees completely
untethered from their nominal principal, the proposal would raise the costs
of lawmaking around recalcitrant committees.100
In addition, there are other mechanisms—albeit costly ones—that Congress could use to perform the aforementioned information dissemination
function should a randomly selected committee truly misuse its more autonomous position. Legislative support agencies, including the Government
Accountability Office, Congressional Research Service, and Congressional
Budget Office can provide a backup source of expertise for legislators.101
96
See generally Sean Gailmard & John W. Patty, Stovepiping (July 12, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://dl.dropbox.com/u/3919370/stovepiping12.pdf (discussing the strategic withholding of information by an expert agent from his or her principal).
97
See Brian D. Feinstein, Oversight, Despite the Odds: Assessing Congressional Committee Hearings as a Means of Control Over the Federal Bureaucracy 34–74 (2009) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University) (on file with Pusey Library, Harvard University)
(describing how subcommittees are less likely to hold oversight hearings when committeechamber preference divergence is high, and positing that this reluctance is rooted in a concern
that the parent chamber may use information derived from oversight hearings in a manner in
which the committee that held the hearing opposes).
98
See SARAH A. BINDER, MINORITY RIGHTS, MAJORITY RULE: PARTISANSHIP AND THE
DEVELOPMENT OF CONGRESS 157–66 (1997).
99
See David Epstein, An Informational Rationale for Committee Gatekeeping Power, 91
PUB. CHOICE 271, 275 (1997).
100
If these potential costs are deemed too high for committees whose proper functioning
is considered absolutely essential to Congress’s business—for example, the Rules and Budget
committees—then perhaps these committees could be excluded from this proposal.
101
See J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, The Congressional Competition to Control Delegated Power, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1443, 1491 (2003) (including “shifting drafting obligations to
party task forces . . . [and] bypassing the committee and using the GAO or CBO to conduct
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Indeed, a regime in which the floor has the option of utilizing randomly
assigned committees, but is not required to do so, may be optimal in some
respects. In such a system, the floor’s decision to use committee channels
for information gathering and bill drafting—rather than resorting to the
aforementioned majoritarian bypasses—would provide a costly signal regarding its motives.102
This silver lining notwithstanding, it seems clear that this proposal, by
weakening the principal-agent relationship between Congress and its committees, could create an additional impediment to the passage of chambersupported legislation. Thus, the proposal could be expected to increase legislative enactment costs. While this potential consequence must be acknowledged, I believe that, in the aggregate, the potential benefits of my proposal
outweigh the two aforementioned potential negative effects—i.e., a decreased likelihood of the development of responsible party government and
higher legislative enactment costs.
IV. COMMITTEE REFORM

AND

LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE RELATIONS

Random assignment also would strengthen Congress’s role in the administrative state. Current scholarship regarding greater political control
over the bureaucracy tends to focus on presidential control,103 seeing congressional committees as imperfect agents for advancing congressional or
popular will.104 Making committees more representative would provide a
rationale for reshifting the balance of power away from the President and
towards Congress. If more democratically accountable institutions ought to
have greater control over the bureaucracy, then making the congressional
committee system more reflective of democratic preferences provides a justification for such a shift.105 Given the drastic growth in presidential in-

agency investigations” in a list of the “ways that Congress might rein in committees that
deviate from the majority’s views”).
102
Cf. Jide Nzelibe & Matthew C. Stephenson, Complementary Constraints: Separation
of Powers, Rational Voting, and Constitutional Design, 123 HARV. L. REV. 617, 620–22
(2010) (suggesting that agreement amongst government branches when one branch could act
unilaterally is interpreted by the electorate as a proxy for motives).
103
See, e.g., MASHAW, supra note 12, at 152–53; James Blumstein, Regulatory Review by
the Executive Office of the President: An Overview and Policy Analysis of Current Issues, 51
DUKE L.J. 851, 887 (2001); Calabresi, supra note 81, at 67; Philip Harter, Executive Oversight
of Rulemaking: The President is No Stranger, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 557, 568 (1987); Kagan,
supra note 17, at 2384; Peter Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The Role of the President and OMB
in Informal Rulemaking, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 181, 183, 190 (1986).
104
See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 17, at 2336 (stating that congressional committees have a
“far more tenuous connection to national majoritarian preferences” than does the President).
105
But see Matthew C. Stephenson, Optimal Political Control of the Bureaucracy, 107
MICH. L. REV. 53, 65 (2008) (challenging the assumption that “increasing the relative influence of the most politically accountable entities over the bureaucracy will increase the
majoritarian responsiveness of bureaucratic policy”).
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volvement in bureaucratic decision making in recent decades, such a
recalibration is needed.106
This part addresses two potential ways in which this proposed reform
could strengthen Congress’s hand vis-à-vis the executive branch. First, I explain how random assignment could encourage greater congressional oversight of the administrative state, since those legislators that are assigned to
oversight-specific subunits—which are generally disfavored seat assignments—would be compelled to choose between involvement in oversight
activities or having no influence in committee-based work whatsoever. Second, I argue that my proposal could strengthen the precarious position of the
committee-based legislative veto. Despite the fact that the Chadha Court
declared the chamber-level legislative veto to be unconstitutional,107 legislative vetoes persist in practice, with over four hundred new veto provisions
enacted since Chadha.108
A. Committee Oversight
Congressional oversight of the administrative state is a vital function of
the legislative branch.109 Yet, as with Congress’s lawmaking function, oversight work often falls by the wayside.110 Random committee assignments
could serve as a corrective, compelling legislators to participate in monitoring the administrative state.
Given the massive delegation of policymaking authority to the executive branch in many areas,111 ex post oversight is arguably the most powerful
way in which Congress can exercise at least some degree of control over
policy outcomes.112 Contrary to their reputation as mere venues for position
taking, oversight hearings can be remarkably effective in altering executive

106

See supra Part I.
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). Although Chadha addressed the constitutionality
of the one-chamber legislative veto, its logic extends to the committee-based legislative veto.
108
LOUIS FISHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 22132, LEGISLATIVE VETOES AFTER
CHADHA 5 (2005).
109
See JOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 69 (Serenity Publishers 2008) (1861) (asserting that “the proper office of a representative assembly
is to watch and control the government; to throw the light of publicity on its acts; to compel a
full exposition and justification of all of them which any one considers questionable”).
110
See MANN & ORNSTEIN, supra note 9, at 170.
111
See LOWI, supra note 5, at 92–126.
112
But see Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Administrative
Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 244, 255 (1987)
[hereinafter McNollgast] (positing that the ex ante design of administrative procedures provides a favored mechanism for maintaining congressional control over administration).
McNollgast’s theory is not without its critics, however. See Glen O. Robinson, Administrative
Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies: Political Uses of Structure and Process,
75 VA. L. REV. 483, 488 (1989) (noting that, contra McNollgast’s theory, interagency procedural uniformity suggests that Congress does not devote much attention to varying procedures to
promote agency responsiveness to favored groups).
107
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branch behavior.113 Oversight hearings can also influence public attitudes,
impacting the success or failure of a presidency.114
Despite the theoretical importance and demonstrated efficacy of oversight, Congress appears relatively uninterested in performing its oversight
function. Oversight-focused subcommittees tend to be disproportionately
populated by less powerful legislators, with senior legislators, party leaders,
and full committee chairs and ranking members rarely serving on subcommittees devoted to oversight and investigatory work.115 My research on subcommittee transfers as a window into legislators’ revealed preferences shows
a strong disinclination to serve on these oversight-focused subunits.116 Expanding the analysis to encompass all congressional subcommittees with the
ability to hold oversight hearings, I found that those subcommittees that
most actively pursue oversight tend to be populated by legislators who are
more junior and less effective in advancing their bills, which further suggests that oversight is pursued by legislators lacking better options.117
Taken together, these two sets of findings offer at least a sliver of optimism. On the one hand, Congress as an institution appears relatively uninterested in conducting oversight of the executive branch. On the other hand,
when oversight hearings do occur, they can be remarkably effective, significantly altering bureaucratic behavior and public perceptions of the executive
branch. When considered in combination, these two statements suggest that
congressional involvement in policy outcomes could be enhanced if Congress were to place greater emphasis on oversight.
Once again, random committee assignment could provide a partial solution, facilitating greater congressional attention to oversight. Legislators that
are randomly assigned to oversight-focused subcommittees would have no
choice but to pursue oversight if they want to have any influence over governance during the length of their assignment. Since oversight has been
demonstrated to be effective when it does occur, an increase in oversight
activity—as well as in the extent to which powerful legislators pursue oversight—could lead to greater congressional control over bureaucratic
behavior.
The expectation that random assignment would lead to some oversightfocused subunits where the majority party is overrepresented, and some
subunits in which the minority party is overrepresented, is also worth noting

113
See Feinstein, supra note 97, at 18 (demonstrating that bureaucratic infractions that are
the subject of oversight hearings are approximately twenty-two percent less likely to recur than
similar infractions for which Congress declines to hold hearings).
114
See Douglas Kriner & Eric Schickler, Investigating the President: Committee Probes
and Presidential Approval, 1953–2006, at 12–17 (2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1900886 (showing that high-profile congressional investigations are associated with decreased public support for the President, which
can “severely weaken” the White House’s agenda).
115
See Feinstein, supra note 97, at 106–20.
116
See Brian D. Feinstein, Avoiding Oversight: Legislator Preferences & Congressional
Monitoring of the Administrative State, 8 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 23, 41 (2011).
117
See Feinstein, supra note 97, at 121–54.
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in the context of oversight. Currently, the partisan ratios on oversight-focused committees and subcommittees—like those for most congressional
subunits—are skewed in favor of the majority party.118 With random assignment, this dynamic could change dramatically. With eighteen House committees with some oversight turf concerning the executive branch, and given
the fact that the majority party has held between fifty-one to sixty-two percent of the chamber in all Congresses since 1985,119 it is likely that random
assignment would lead to some nontrivial number of committees in which
the minority party controls the gavel.
Minority party control of some committees—a likely outcome with random assignment—would help ensure that at least some congressional
subunits engage in monitoring the executive branch when the chamber and
White House are controlled by the same party.120 Even considering that
Congress is unlikely to be receptive to legislation and committee reports
produced by minority party–led oversight committees, the ability of oversight hearings to capture media attention and sway public opinion may spark
congressional action.121
To be sure, a situation in which the minority party controls a randomly
selected group of oversight subunits, leading to vigorous oversight of an
essentially random set of issue areas and more lackadaisical efforts elsewhere, is not ideal. Nonetheless, I believe that it compares favorably to the
current system, under which oversight of the executive branch decreases significantly during periods of unified government, when committees have
strong partisan incentives not to criticize executive branch action.122
This relative lack of attention to oversight during unified government is
concerning. According to Bruce Ackerman, a Congress that is dominated by
the President’s co-partisans may be unwilling to provide a needed check on
executive branch extralegal action in times of national emergency.123 Congressional silence during an emergency could allow presidential action that,
although it may be seen as necessary in the critical moment, seems excessive
in hindsight124 and even could provide a fatal blow to the separation-of-powers system. A committee system with a heterogeneous mix of partisan ratios
could militate against this prospect. With some committees controlled by
118

See TONG, supra note 92, at 6–20.
See id. This figure includes the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and all
House standing committees, except for the Ethics, House Administration, and Rules
committees.
120
Cf. U.S. GOV’T PRINTING OFFICE, BUSINESS MEETINGS ON CONGRESSIONAL REFORM
LEGISLATION: MEETINGS OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE ORGANIZATION OF CONGRESS, ONE
HUNDRED THIRD CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION, MARKUP OF CONGRESSIONAL REFORM LEGISLATION 206 (1993) (proposing to prohibit the President’s party from controlling the committee
now labeled Oversight & Government Reform).
121
See Kriner & Schickler, supra note 114, at 6.
122
See Douglas Kriner & Liam Schwartz, Divided Government and Congressional Investigations, 33 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 295 (2008) (showing a statistically significant, positive correlation between unified government and oversight activity).
123
BRUCE ACKERMAN, BEFORE THE NEXT ATTACK 85, 190 n.9 (2006).
124
See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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the opposition party, the probability that at least some congressional organs
will be willing to challenge presidential action may increase significantly.125
While the prospect of increased congressional monitoring of the executive is
beneficial under normal circumstances, it may be vital in preserving our system of government in times of crisis.
B. The Legislative Veto
In the wake of twin Supreme Court decisions striking down the oneand two-chamber legislative vetoes,126 mechanisms for committees to exercise control over agency decisions persist, including both formal committee
veto provisions inserted into statutes and informal understandings between
committees and agencies.127 Whether formal or informal, these veto mechanisms have the same effect: they prevent administrative agencies from taking certain actions without the prior approval of a specified committee or
committees.128
While these mechanisms arguably are a practical necessity, without
which Congress may be less willing to delegate policy-making power to
agencies in the first place,129 they rest on constitutionally shaky ground.130
Apart from the standard formalist separation-of-powers critique, scholars
have advanced functional reasons for opposing the ability of congressional
subunits to veto bureaucracy decisions.131 For instance, Cass Sunstein and
Adrian Vermeule argue that the legislative veto may “aggravate[ ] the
power of self-interested private groups over processes of lawmaking,”
which is at odds with the functional purpose of the Presentment Clause and

125
Cf. ACKERMAN, supra note 123, at 85 (proposing that in times of national emergency,
“members of the opposition political parties should be guaranteed the majority of seats on
oversight committees,” to prevent the President’s co-partisans in Congress from giving the
White House carte blanche); William E. Scheuerman, Emergency Powers, 2 ANN. REV. L. &
SOC. SCI. 257, 273 (2006) (“[O]ther countries have experimented with minority control of
legislative committees; some empirical evidence implies that it works well as a device for
preventing committees from becoming mere lapdogs for the executive.”).
126
U.S. Senate v. FTC, 463 U.S. 1216 (1983) (two-chamber veto); INS v. Chadha, 462
U.S. 919 (1983) (one-chamber veto).
127
See FISHER, supra note 108, at 3.
128
See id. at 5–6. For instance, norms have developed around certain committee-agency
relationships which effectively prevent the agency from transferring funds from one program
to another without the committee’s preapproval. See id.
129
See, e.g., City of New Haven v. United States, 809 F.2d 900 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
130
Although the Supreme Court has not directly addressed the constitutionality of these
committee-based mechanisms, the D.C. Circuit has objected to some informal, postenactment
involvement in agency decisions by the chairs of those congressional committees with jurisdiction over the agency. See Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 408–10 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (noting, in dicta, that there are limits on permissible congressional communications with agencies);
D.C. Fed’n of Civic Ass’ns v. Volpe, 459 F.2d 1231, 1246 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (holding that an
administrative decision “would be invalid if based in whole or in part on the pressures emanating from [a member of Congress]” that were not relevant to the applicable statute).
131
See Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L.
REV. 885 (2003).
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bicameralism principles.132 To the extent that random assignment reduces
the likelihood of interest group capture of committees, as argued in Part
III.C, this functional argument against committee-based legislative vetoes
loses much of its rhetorical force. In this way, random committee assignments could buttress the constitutional case for committee-based legislative
vetoes.
In addition to addressing this theoretical objection to the legislative
veto, random assignment could lead to an expansion of the legislative
branch’s de facto ability to block some administrative action. The threat of
statutory or budgetary penalties for an agency that disobeys Congress can
provide an effective deterrent to some bureaucratic actions.133 Essentially,
these mechanisms can serve as soft law’s version of the legislative veto.134
Agencies may alter their behavior based on the disapproval of bicameral
majorities, near-majorities in one chamber, or even a single legislator.135
Under my proposal, committee disapproval of proposed agency action could
have an even stronger deterrent effect. Expressions of disapproval emanating from a committee that is representative of the parent chamber’s preferences—which, once again, would be the case in expectation under my
proposal—could provide a strong signal to agencies of the overall legislative
branch’s likely preferences, thereby strengthening the informal mechanisms
available to Congress to exercise de facto influence over the administrative
state.
V. COMMITTEE REFORM

AND

LEGISLATIVE-JUDICIAL RELATIONS

Apart from the potential effects of random assignment on Congress’s
internal functioning, this proposal also could alter the posture that the judiciary adopts in considering legislative outputs. For cases involving statutory
interpretation, this reform could increase the value of committee documents
in determining legislative intent. In the narrower set of cases involving assessments of the constitutionality of legislation, this proposal could weaken
the theoretical foundations of public choice–based arguments for stringent
judicial review, which are based on pessimistic assumptions regarding the
legislative process. In ways both direct and subtle, this dramatic change to
the committee system could alter the perspectives that judges hold regarding
congressional action.
132

Id. at 943.
See Feinstein, supra note 97, at 156–61.
134
See Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Soft Law: Lessons from Congressional Practice,
61 STAN. L. REV. 573, 606 (2008).
135
See id. at 606–07 (providing examples of concurrent resolutions that served to alter
agency policy); id. at 606 (recounting how the FTC reversed course on proposed changes to its
“Made in U.S.A.” labeling requirements following the introduction—but not passage—of a
House resolution cosponsored by over two hundred legislators). See generally MORRIS P.
FIORINA, CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE WASHINGTON ESTABLISHMENT (2d ed. 1989) (describing legislator intervention in bureaucratic actions on behalf of constituents as a central function
of legislators).
133
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A. The Use of Legislative History in Statutory Interpretation
By leading to committees that are representative of the floor in expectation, random assignment has the potential to strengthen the connection between committee-produced legislative history and Congress-level legislative
intent. This change, in turn, could increase the informative value of legislative history in statutory interpretation. With legislative documents that more
accurately reflect Congress’s purposes in enacting a given statute, judges
may be more willing to inquire into legislative purpose, thereby altering the
congressional-judicial relationship in a manner that shifts the balance of
power towards Congress.
As explained in Part III, supra, the current assignment process, in
which committee members are chosen via a combination of self-initiative
and party selection, leads to committee membership rosters that often are
unrepresentative of the floor—or, more relevant to this part, that tend to be
unrepresentative of the enacting coalition for any given bill. Given the role
of committee documents in forming a bill’s legislative history, the current
committee selection process may lead to distorted committee documents as a
supposed record of Congress’s views. This distortion casts doubt on claims
that legislative history accurately reflects congressional intent.136
1. Committees as a Proxy for the Enacting Coalition
Random assignment can help assuage these concerns. For theories of
statutory interpretation that involve judges estimating the views of a statute’s
enacting coalition, representative committees enhance the value of floor
speeches and committee documents in judges’ assessments of legislative history. Committee members are often highly engaged in floor discussion of
their discharged bills,137 and committee-produced documents may play a
prominent role in convincing legislators to vote for bills.138 Therefore, to the
extent that these communications are representative of the views of the
chamber, their value in statutory interpretation increases.
2. Committees as a Proxy for Current Enactable Preferences
Representative committees also could provide support for theories of
dynamic statutory interpretation that involve judges estimating the “enactable preferences” of the current Congress, i.e., the hypothetical statute on the
subject in question that the current Congress would enact, were it to consider

136
See Neal Devins, Congressional Factfinding and the Scope of Judicial Review: A Preliminary Analysis, 50 DUKE L.J. 1169, 1183–84 (2001).
137
See George Costello, Average Voting Members and Other “Benign Fictions”: The Relative Reliability of Committee Reports, Floor Debates, and Other Sources of Legislative History, 1990 DUKE L.J. 39, 52.
138
See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKLEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 72 (2000).
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the topic.139 Committees periodically hold hearings, some of which are mandated by law, on a variety of current government programs.140 As a result,
for any particular program or agency, it is far easier for a judicial observer to
estimate the views of the congressional committee with jurisdiction over that
program or agency than it is to estimate the views of Congress overall. With
representative committees, these views are identical in expectation.
Consideration of current committee preferences in statutory interpretation is controversial.141 The use of contemporary committee documents to
interpret statutes passed by prior Congresses both substitutes inquiry into the
motives of a past Congress for that of the current body and assumes, pars
pro toto, that the judgment of a committee reflects that of all actors in the
lawmaking process. Whether misguided or not, the practice nonetheless
does exist, with the Supreme Court occasionally relying on legislative history produced by postenactment Congresses as interpretative authority in
evaluating the meaning of statutes enacted by prior Congresses.142 For those
judges who believe that inquiry into current enactable preferences is a legitimate judicial function, a random committee assignment system could improve the quality of the signal sent by committee documents in determining
enactable preferences.
3. Restoring Congress’s “Final Say” Advantage in the Creation of
Legislative History
A tighter connection between committee preferences and those of the
enacting coalition could serve as a check on the White House’s role in creating “legislative” history. Committees that in expectation are representative
of the floor are well-positioned to respond to the increased use of presidential signing statements, which threaten to intrude on the position of Congress-generated legislative history as the primary extrastatutory means of
determining the intent of the enacting coalition.143 Signing statements may
be used as an executive branch analogue to legislative history, creating a
139

See EINER ELHAUGE, STATUTORY DEFAULT RULES 9 (2008).
See generally Jeffrey Talbert, Bryan Jones & Frank Baumgartner, Nonlegislative Hearings and Policy Change in Congress, 39 AM. J. POL. SCI. 383 (1995).
141
See, e.g., Sullivan v. Finkelstein, 496 U.S. 617, 631 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part) (disagreeing with a statutory interpretation that considers “what committees of the 99th
and 95th Congresses thought the 76th Congress intended”).
142
See, e.g., id. at 628 n.8 (majority opinion); Andrus v. Shell Oil Co., 446 U.S. 657, 666
n.8 (1980); Seatrain Shipbuilding Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 444 U.S. 572, 596 (1980); see also
Nicholas Q. Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2085,
2135 (2002) (noting, with disapproval, “the Court’s current practice of giving some interpretative authority to subsequent legislative history”); cf. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000) (analyzing statutes enacted by subsequent Congresses to divine an
earlier Congress’s intended meaning of the word “drug” in the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
of 1938).
143
While presidents vary in their issuance of signing statements, the overall trend has been
an increased use of these statements to challenge particular statutory provisions. See TODD
GARVEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33667, PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS: CONSTITUTIONAL AND INSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS 2–10 (2012).
140
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postpassage record of presidential intent regarding the bill.144 The fact that
the President is typically the final actor to comment on the meaning of a
statute in such a formal capacity may provide an advantage to the executive
in shaping the legislative history on which future courts may rely.
The presence of randomly assigned committees, which are representative of the floor in expectation, would provide a counterweight to this presidential “final say” advantage. Since committee action involves lower
resource costs than chamber or congressional action, it is generally less
costly for committees, as opposed to either the parent chamber or Congress,
to counter postenactment “executive history” that conflicts with congressional intent. With committees that are representative of the floor in expectation, these subunits’ postenactment statements might carry more weight
with courts. While such postenactment documents cannot be said to have
the approval of the parent chamber, courts could at least be secure in the
knowledge that postenactment committee documents are not the product of
either homogenous high-demanders or party elites’ influence.
B. Committee Documents as Soft Law
Random assignment also could enhance the interpretive value that
judges assign to committee documents produced after the passage of the
relevant bill. Judges’ use of postenactment committee documents for guidance regarding current congressional preferences and intentions can be seen
as analogous to the use of “soft law” in other fields.145 In a variety of areas,
documents without the formal force of law influence the behavior of political actors by establishing or strengthening norms or providing a window into
the relevant bodies’ potential future litigating positions.146 These documents
with law-like effects include presidential signing statements, nonbinding
declarations by international bodies, and agency policy manuals.
Jacob Gersen and Eric Posner believe that legislative documents, with
similar attributes as the above instruments, should be treated similarly. Gersen and Posner propose that congressional resolutions be treated as a form of
legislative soft law,147 arguing that a resolution both “communicates congressional intentions more accurately and cheaply than does a regular statute
. . . and communicates the views of a chamber or the Congress more accu144
On the strategic use of signing statements for a prospective judicial audience, see
Memorandum from Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., to the Litig. Strategy Working Grp., Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice 1–2 (Feb. 5, 1986) (on file
with the National Archives and Records Administration) (“Congress churns out great masses
of legislative history bearing on its intent. . . . Presidents have traditionally created nothing
comparable. . . . [T]he issuance of interpretative signing statements would have two chief
advantages. First, it would increase the power of the Executive to shape the law. Second, by
forcing some rethinking by courts . . . , it may help curb some of the prevalent abuses of
legislative history.”).
145
See Gersen & Posner, supra note 134, at 610–12; see also Chafetz, supra note 8, at
742–68 (describing other sources of congressional soft power).
146
See Gersen & Posner, supra note 134, at 576.
147
See id. at 577–78.
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rately than do statements of individual legislators, whose views will often
diverge from that of the majority.”148 As such, these congressional documents can influence the policy-making processes of other institutions crafting hard law—i.e., courts and agencies—that may “take legislative views as
an input.”149 A recent Harvard Law Review student note extends this idea,
proposing that courts apply Chevron deference to congressional resolutions
“that adopt[ ] a reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute.”150
Despite the potentially useful soft-law function of these resolutions, the
House passes only a few resolutions that deal with substantive issues per
year.151 Committee documents could supplement these relatively rare House
resolutions as an advisory source of soft law. Of course, a document produced by a congressional subunit offers less clear guidance than a resolution
adopted by the chamber. Random assignment, however, could give committee documents some soft law–like characteristics. As previously detailed,
ending the dual influences of self-selection and party-selection on committee
assignments will ensure that committees, in expectation, are representative
of the floor. As such, courts—as well as agencies seeking to determine congressional preferences for interpretative or policy-making purposes—could
assign some “soft law” weight to committee documents. Such committee
instruments naturally would provide less persuasive authority than chamber
or congressional resolutions. Rather, a legal positivist might place committee documents somewhere in the middle of the soft-law continuum, situated
between bicameral resolutions—arguably the quintessential form of legislative soft law152—and statements by individual legislators—which rarely
have law-like elements.153
C. Judicial Deference on Constitutional Questions
Random committee assignment also could encourage more deferential
judicial review. To see why, I again note the heightened probability of interest group capture under the current system.154 Responding to interest group
capture of the committee-based legislative process, a group of prominent
scholars advocates heightened judicial scrutiny of the constitutionality of
legislation, particularly for bills that may be deemed “private regarding” or
otherwise benefiting discrete interests.155 Legal theorist Bernard Siegan

148

Id. at 578.
Id. at 579.
150
Note, A Chevron for the House and Senate: Deferring to Post-Enactment Congressional Resolutions That Interpret Ambiguous Statutes, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1507, 1508–09
(2011).
151
See Gersen & Posner, supra note 134, at 581.
152
See id. at 580–81.
153
See id. at 584.
154
See supra Part III.C.
155
See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43,
46–47, 80–81 (1989); Jerry L. Mashaw, Constitutional Deregulation: Notes Toward a Public,
Public Law, 54 TUL. L. REV. 849, 874–75 (1980); Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in Ameri149
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would prescribe even stronger medicine: Lochner-style substantive due process review for economic regulatory laws as a partial corrective for a captured legislative process.156
Random committee assignments could temper these calls for heightened constitutional review. To the extent that random assignment reduces
capture,157 the theoretical foundation for these interventionist interpretative
theories is weakened. Indeed, any movement towards more representative
committee outputs—and, hence, more majoritarian legislative outcomes—
buttresses the case for an alternative, restrained approach, based on a desire
to respect laws that are presumed to be the product of majoritarian
processes.158
VI. FEASIBILITY
I have argued that this proposal is desirable; but is it feasible? At first
glance, it may seem Pollyannaish to presume that Congress is interested in
bolstering its institutional capacity. After all, it is not obvious how altering
the chamber’s internal rules directly furthers any of the goals that scholars
believe motivate congressional action.159 More broadly, one may question
whether Congress has the ability to consider such a proposal, which can
promise mostly abstract, later-stage potential benefits.160
There are a few potential responses to these concerns. As an initial
matter, I note that past Congresses have demonstrated an interest in, and
aptitude for, designing complex bureaucratic institutions and procedures to
further congressional goals.161 As with my proposal, the effects of these bureaucratic structures are indirect and accrue over a somewhat long-term horizon.162 Given the similarities between legislative and administrative

can Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 71–73 (1985); Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and
the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689, 1731 (1984).
156
BERNARD H. SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 265–303 (1980).
157
See supra Part III.C.
158
See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW (1980).
159
See MAYHEW, supra note 37 (theorizing that reelection is the most central goal);
Fenno, supra note 1 (listing reelection, power in Washington, and public policy goals as legislators’ primary objectives).
160
See ARNOLD, supra note 38, at 27 (discussing Congress’s disinclination to consider
measures with complex, long-term, “collective reward” characteristics).
161
See, e.g., DAVID E. LEWIS, PRESIDENTS AND THE POLITICS OF AGENCY DESIGN 21–38
(2003) (on Congress’s role in agency design); Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Timing Rules
and Legal Institutions, 121 HARV. L. REV. 543, 551–52 (2007) (on statutory-timing rules);
McNollgast, supra note 112 (on the design of administrative procedures).
162
See Murray Horn & Kenneth A. Shepsle, Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 499 (1989) (positing that legislators design administrative structures with an eye toward minimizing the effects on agency policy of “coalitional
drift” in future Congresses).
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institutional design,163 it may not be unreasonable for legislators to balance
similar considerations in overhauling their internal institutions.
Moreover, members of Congress possess an electoral incentive to alter
their branch’s own structures under certain circumstances.164 For instance,
anticorruption sentiments among voters during the mid-1970s helped elect a
new crop of liberal Democrats.165 These so-called “Watergate babies” allied
with backbench Republicans to push for reforms—over the objections of
most majority-party Democrats and the Democratic leadership.166 Eventually, more senior legislators sensed the electoral value of a reform agenda
and passed measures weakening the seniority system.167 With anti-Congress
sentiment particularly high in recent years,168 legislators may be convinced
of the electoral utility of institutional reform.
A stronger critique of the feasibility of this proposal highlights the costs
that such a drastic reform would impose on those who benefit from the status
quo. These beneficiaries could be expected to vigorously oppose any change
to their privileged positions. The most obvious members of this group include legislators with seats on generally popular committees. Perhaps more
importantly, the proposal arguably would make most legislators worse off in
the short term. Assuming that many legislators have particularized committee preference orderings, the status quo regime of partial self-selection likely
offers a better set of assignments for the average legislator than would a
random assignment system. Given these concerns, one may question
whether Congress would enact such a proposed change.
These are high hurdles, but they are not insurmountable. In a comprehensive survey of institutional changes in Congress, Eric Schickler shows
that successful institutional reformers are able to tap into more than one of
legislators’ multiple motivations, which he labels (1) reelection for all incumbents; (2) congressional capacity, power, or prestige; (3) institutional
power bases (e.g., low-ranking members versus senior legislators); (4) partisan interests; and (5) policy interests.169 To succeed, “policy entrepreneurs”
must devise reforms that serve as a “common carrier” for some of these
interests, and overcome opposition from legislators who are motivated by
those interests that will be harmed by the change.170
On the one hand, there are a few significant ways in which random
assignment would benefit self-interested legislators. As detailed throughout
163
Cf. Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous Branch From Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314 (2006) (noting the similarities between interbranch design features and intra–executive branch features).
164
See SCHICKLER, supra note 39, at 186.
165
See NELSON POLSBY, HOW CONGRESS EVOLVES 65–72 (2004).
166
See Eric Schickler, Eric McGhee & John Sides, Remaking the House and Senate: Personal Power, Ideology, and the 1970s Reforms, 28 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 297, 311–12 (2003).
167
See SCHICKLER, supra note 39, at 190.
168
See supra Part I.B.
169
See SCHICKLER, supra note 39, at 11.
170
Id. at 250.
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this article, this proposal is squarely aimed at increasing Congress’s lawmaking capacity, its position vis-à-vis the executive branch, and, relatedly, its
institutional prestige.171 It also arguably serves institutional power-base interests if more junior members can be convinced that a pay-for-play system
for desirable committee seats and leadership positions disadvantages greener
legislators, who typically have fewer connections to—and less to offer—
potential donors. On the other hand, by weakening parties, the proposal
clearly is at odds with partisan interests. Moreover, the proposal also runs
contrary to legislators’ reelection interests, as it prevents legislators from
self-selecting onto those committees that are most closely tied to their constituents’ interests.
There are good reasons to believe that this former set of interests may
overcome the forces favoring the status quo. It does not seem to be much of
a stretch, for instance, to assume that legislators desire membership in a
functioning and respected institution. This desire is arguably the foundational motive of many politicians—even more fundamental than reelection,
since, aside from the salary, membership in an institution with no lawmaking
capacity or popular prestige serves little purpose. In addition, some legislators surely could be convinced that a diminished Congress hinders their ability to achieve goals beyond simply being reelected, for example, publicpolicy or personal-status objectives. Such arguments likely would have particular resonance with those at the bottom of the congressional hierarchy,
chafing under a system that may be stacked against them. If framed properly, therefore, I believe that these interests could compel a critical mass of
legislators to support this proposal.
Although overcoming these electoral and partisan interests with appeals
to institutional capacity may be challenging, doing so is conceivable. Historically, reforms aimed at increasing congressional power tend to be most
effective when they follow periods of presidential aggrandizement.172 Given
recent shifts in the balance of power between Congress and the White
House, particularly during the post-9/11 wars, such appeals may be particularly salient now.173 Indeed, the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946—
arguably the most comprehensive, disruptive structural reform since the establishment of committees in the First Congress—passed under similar circumstances; institutional capacity arguments, coming on the heels of
President Franklin Roosevelt’s dominance of policy making during World
War II, helped drive its enactment.174
Under the right circumstances, these institutional-capacity and powerbase concerns could become so acute that they overwhelm resistance based
on the belief that the new regime would be welfare-reducing for many legis-
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supra Part II.
SCHICKLER, supra note 39, at 263.
supra Part I.C.
SCHICKLER, supra note 39, at 24.
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lators in the short term. In this way, my proposal bears a resemblance to
framework legislation that provides long-term solutions to legislators’ collective action problems, at the expense of their more immediate, individualized
interests in exerting influence over district-specific concerns.175 The passage
of such framework legislation demonstrates Congress’s willingness to tie its
own hands, achieving outcomes that maximize collective welfare while forgoing particularized benefits, for example, tariff protections for a districtspecific industry or preservation of a military base within the district—or, in
this case, maintenance of a seat on a committee that serves district
interests.176
CONCLUSION
This article offers a novel change to a bedrock congressional institution.
Although this proposal does not require much more than one sentence to
describe, its descriptive simplicity is deceiving. The article outlines the
many changes to Congress’s internal capacity and its relations with the other
branches that would stem from this reform. These changes, in the aggregate,
would be overwhelmingly positive. Prospective intrabranch benefits include
fostering a more democratically responsive and less polarized Congress; enhancing the institution’s ability to develop credible, diverse sources of expertise in its own members; discouraging interest group capture; and facilitating
deliberation and the consideration of minority views. This reform also
would enhance Congress’s position vis-à-vis the other branches: facilitating
congressional monitoring of the administrative state; strengthening the theoretical foundations for the legislative veto and other unilateral committee
actions with soft-law effects; encouraging judges to place greater weight on
legislative history in statutory interpretation; and offering a response to arguments in favor of strict judicial review of legislative enactments based on
interest group capture of the lawmaking process.
There is no shortage of reform proposals aimed, at least in part, at impacting Congress. From the left, a nascent movement to amend the Constitution to overturn Citizens United appears to be gathering support;177 from
the right, a loose affiliation of Tea Party groups has set its sights on repealing
the 17th Amendment;178 and an ideologically diverse coalition of groups ad175
Cf. Elizabeth Garrett, Conditions for Framework Legislation 3 (USC Law & Econ.,
Research Paper No. 04-23; USC CLEO, Research Paper No. C04-20, 2004), available at http:/
/papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=588901 (noting that “solving collective action
problems” is one purpose of framework laws).
176
See Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 100-526, (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 2687 (1990)); Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411–20 (1988)).
177
See Sam Favate, Obama Supports Constitutional Amendment on Campaign Finance “If
Necessary,” WALL ST. J. (Feb. 7, 2012, 12:09 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2012/02/07/
obama-supports-constitutional-amendment-on-campaign-finance-if-necessary/.
178
See Editorial, Original Deconstruction, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/oct/21/opinion/la-ed-amendment-20101021.
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vocates a constitutional convention, in substantial part to “fix Congress
first.”179 In contrast to these constitutional or extraconstitutional proposals,
implementing random committee assignments would require merely a simple, one-chamber resolution. Given the magnitude of the problems facing
Congress, the actual and potential spillover effects of these problems, the
prospective benefits of this proposal, and the relatively low costs associated
with it, institutional designers would be well-served by turning their attention to congressional committees.

179
See CONFERENCE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, http://conconcon.org (last
visited Dec. 26, 2012); see also Lawrence Lessig & Mark McKinnon, How to Sober up Washington, DAILY BEAST (Apr. 6, 2010), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2010/04/06/howto-tell-dc-politicians-to-go-to-hell.html.

